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IAD - 76/66
8 August 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to the Director, NPIC

FROM: Chief, Imagery Analysis Division, CIA

SUBJECT: General Comments on the JIIRG Report

1. Pursuant to your request the responsible officers of IAD have reviewed the JIIRG report and the various appendices for comment. Overall, the report appears to be poorly conceived, redundant, ambiguous, non-factual and extremely shallow and poorly thought out in its methodology. Full of cliches as to the depth of concentration, thought, and soul searching, this report fails to ever come to grips with the primary problem of whether there is to be a true National Center and secondary problem of increased inputs and rising money and manpower requirements.

2. We cannot subscribe to a proposal that:

a. Under the guise of efficiency and "sharing" the workload, delegates away the cost and personnel effectiveness of a Centralized National Center, divides a cohesive responsibility among 3 organizations; 2 of which are separately administered, one of which is proven of doubtful objectivity. Further, adding to this proliferation of National Centers, the necessary duplicative support, liaison, coordination, files, etc., necessary to make 3 Centers function along in a somewhat parallel course, and then superimpose over this conglomerate a DOD stacked "authority" which will virtually deprive the Director/NPIC of his authority in the Imagery Interpretation Field and place the management of a national data base within a committee.

b. In addition to depriving the National Center of a major portion of its present responsibility, proposes to elevate DIA to the status of a National Intelligence producer, a role assigned CIA by the National Security Act of 1947. History is replete with crises created by non-objective reporting on the part of the military services in the past.

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c. Recommends that DOD-managed OPICs be accepted for all National overseas readout and the [] accepted as a National producer. Thus we will have DOD directing:

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COMEX (Control of NPIC and National Data Base)
Overseas Exploitation
Advanced Manned Programs
Major portion of 3rd Phase Basic Exploitation

d. Predicates all manpower allocations put forth in this report on an erroneous PI manyear figure (1352 which is an overall NPIC figure); a target count which is meaningless in the context of exploitation as it is never defined within the report; and an arbitrary PI base within each of the 3 major PI organizations which took into account none of IAD's manpower needs for exploiting requirements never submitted because of our lack of manpower, and further ignored our role in training and administering NPIC CIA PI personnel. The net effect of this exercise was to reduce NPIC and IAD personnel needs far below requirements and boost DIA's through assignment to them of the majority of "Targets" for National basic 3rd Phase Reporting.

e. Contains many figures which do not seem to relate, but are the source of certain conclusions having considerable significance to all parties concerned. If any credence is to be given the methodology within this report, ample time should be allotted to verify and study the source and figures used to derive the conclusions and and analyse other specifics within the report.

3. In summary therefore to accept this proposal will:

a. Raise DIA within the ZI to an equal partner with CIA in the production of National Intelligence for the entire community rather than, as proscribed, for the support of DOD.

b. Remove a large portion of the National Center's responsibility for National Reporting.

c. Curtail the responsibilities for policy and management by the Director/NPIC.

d. Officially charge DOD with National Responsibilities for all 1st Phase overseas exploitation and a major share of advanced manned flight collection/exploitation.

e. Manage the entire complex and significant imagery intelligence exploitation by committee -- dominated by DOD.

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f. Eliminate the exchange of basic-derived intelligence through formal reporting, confining this activity to a single source.

g. Reduce NPIC and IAD's manpower levels below their capability to perform, but raising DIA's beyond the level they originally requested.

4. We do not feel the above course will prove profitable from the standpoint of providing the best intelligence possible to U.S. leadership at a saving in manpower or money. On the contrary we feel in total that it would be a severe blow to the proven processes that have developed and have supplied high quality intelligence for command decision during the past 10 years, and further that this degradation of effectiveness will cost considerably more in both money and manpower.



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ATTACHMENT:

Comments & Questions - JIIRG Report

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ATTACHMENT TO IAD - 76/66

SOME SPECIFIC COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS REGARDING THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF JIIRG

The basic assumption that one draws from reading the JIIRG report, though not stated, is that NPIC has failed as a National Photo Interpretation Center. The cause of the failure is not clearly defined, nor for that matter even mentioned, and the corrective measures recommended relegating NPIC to the role of just another PI shop working on the National PI problem. In order to do this of course it is necessary to elevate IAD and DIAAP-1 to the national level. In other words the only rationale left for the continuation of NPIC is to consolidate first and second phase reporting. With regard to these two functions there are no valid reasons for not having them done at NPIC and the community wide survey of users disclosed that the first phase reporting was considered excellent in quality and very timely. (The annex draft covering this is in error in that it does not reflect the views of the two members who made the survey nor does it reflect the draft report they submitted). Second phase reporting was not received by the users in quite the same light and in fact received criticism with regard to timeliness.

The basic reporting area is where the committee could have made some firm clear cut recommendations which would have been of benefit to the Intelligence Community. The decision that should have been made here was whether or not we are going to have a National PI Center. This decision was not made. As a result no clear cut course was pursued and no real problem has been solved. Rather than face the problem and make a decision that might necessarily offend someone an attempt has been to bless all. A study of the Tasking Plan and recommendation for manpower estimates will reveal the extent to which each was blessed. The blessing CIA and IAD received is certainly not sufficient to save them from the flaming inferno.

The National Tasking Plan is set up to avoid duplication. Does it do this? Does it recognize the existence of NPIC as a National Center? Does it allocate responsibility according to the responsibilities of the parent organization? In essence the answers to all these questions are no. Then what does it do? It elevates DIAAP-1 and CIA/IAD to the role of satisfying national requirements. It relegates NPIC to the role of just another PI shop.

It does not do away with duplication because the two departmental PI shops will continue to produce the reports they have produced before in response to direct support requests. It will not, however, allow them to be published and where CIA or DIA have produced a perfectly acceptable report on a given target the other will be unaware of its existence and be forced into producing the same report. Instead of doing away with duplication this has all the earmarks of increasing duplication.

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If there is a need for a basic data base on PI derived information then why not let NPIC produce it. The arguments used to support the delegation of responsibility to the various producers of the data base are inconsistent and not valid in all instances. An argument is used to support the centralization in the case of NPIC and then a contrary argument is used to support assignment to departmental shops. In the assignment of strategic weapons production to NPIC, weapons production to DIAAP-1 and non-military industry to IAD we have a bag of worms. As a case in point production of Bear aircraft at the Kuybyshev Airframe Plant has been a point of debate at the national level since 1960 or before. In addition this delegation of responsibility ignores the role of CIA as being primarily responsible for the production of economic intelligence.

In essence it fails to recognize NPIC as the National Center. NPIC has no more important role at the national level than does DIAAP-1.

Will CIA be prepared to accept at face value PI reports prepared by DIA? On what basis will they accept them? DIA has no historical background in the production of PI reports upon which CIA can judge their capability, reliability, or objectivity.

Another question that comes to mind here is what is DIA's role in the production of national intelligence as opposed to it's role in supporting DOD. Does this paper elevate, through delegation of responsibility, to a role it does really not have?

One organization that seems to be consistently ignored or shunted aside is Why? Untold funds have been poured into building this organization and yet its role is never clearly defined nor is any mention made as to who would handle 1st and 2nd phase reporting of any inputs they may obtain in the future.

What is the present situation with regard to the OPIC. This paper treats them as though they were accepted into the National PI framework. Are they? Or are we trying to get this acceptance through this report.

With regard to the statements that this concept will create a saving of manpower I can do nothing but take the strongest exception. There is absolutely no validity to the use of 1352 as the productive manyear. This is not an accurate measure of productive time for a PI. It does not agree with the figures compiled by IAD over an extended period of time, it does not even reflect PI productive time in PAG. What is it then? It is a figure that has been arbitrarily decided upon apparently because a true figure could not be determined or was not determined. Is this what we want to live with in the future? Is this the figure we want to have quoted by BOB in discussion of manpower needs? We can't operate with it today so how can we live with it tomorrow.

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How did we arrive at the manpower projections for the various PI units? We first assumed they are handling the problem satisfactorily today. This is not true. Basic PI reports are not being produced in a timely manner on all targets by either NPIC or IAD, and DIAAP-1 does not produce reports of its own. It might be further stated that comments have been passed to this division from Headquarters that the quality of the reports produced by DIAAP-1 through NPIC (MILOB) did not entirely meet the requirements and therefore were not totally acceptable. These were identified in several annexes as being basic reports. How are you going to handle this type of problem in the future when the scale of the problem will be greatly increased.

Next we assume that it is going to take a certain number of hours for the production of basic reports. Where did this figure come from? With the exception of MILOB and certain reports produced by NPIC there exists no larger grouping of reports that could be considered basic reports. We therefore question the manhour figures assigned to the production of these reports.

Next, we have to determine the number of targets we have on which to prepare reports. What is a target? This is never clearly defined. At times NPIC is used, at other times the BE and TDI are used, at other times national planning documents are used. Is one definition of a target compatible with all these lists. If not, then how can we arrive at a number of targets?

In summation the PI manyear is inaccurate, the number of targets is at best a gross estimate, and I question the validity of the manhours per report. In other words our allocations for manpower in future years is based upon something less than reality. The use of figures quite frequently goes along way in justifying a conclusion let us not fall into this trap based on these figures.

Who is going to run this organization? A Committee? Here again is where they failed to present a firm path to follow. This is where they had the opportunity to really develop the concept of National PI. They could have succeeded by recommending a centralized organization at an appropriate level with a director vested with the responsibility and given the authority to make it operate. In his place we have a committee, COMEX, with all the inherent weaknesses of committee direction. And how is COMEX staffed? With the USIB membership plus Army, Navy and Air Force! What do we have so far? A CIA directed NPIC yielding a large part of the National PI effort to DIA, an allocation of manpower that increases the previously anticipated needs of DIA (who have yet to fulfill their National commitment) and reduces those of NPIC and CIA, and a committee staffed largely from DOD is going to direct this effort.

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I think it goes without saying that photography is the major data input today to national intelligence. Are we now after all the effort put forth by CIA going to turn over the whole show to DIA? The consequences resulting from the acceptance of the JIRG report would be overwhelming. CIA as a national intelligence organization would be hard-pressed to fulfill it's mission and would be saddled with financing a national center with little recourse as to how it was operated.

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